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Abstract
Non-malleable secret sharing (NMSS) schemes, introduced by Goyal and Kumar (STOC 2018),
ensure that a secret m can be distributed into shares m1, · · · , mn (for some n), such that any t (a
parameter ≤ n) shares can be reconstructed to recover the secret m, any t − 1 shares doesn’t leak
information about m and even if the shares that are used for reconstruction are tampered, it is
guaranteed that the reconstruction of these tampered shares will either result in the original m or
something independent of m. Since their introduction, non-malleable secret sharing schemes sparked
a very impressive line of research.
In this work, we introduce a feature of local reconstructability in NMSS, which allows recon-
struction of any portion of a secret by reading just a few locations of the shares. This is a useful
feature, especially when the secret is long or when the shares are stored in a distributed manner on
a communication network. In this work, we give a compiler that takes in any non-malleable secret
sharing scheme and compiles it into a locally reconstructable non-malleable secret sharing scheme.
To secret share a message consisting of k blocks of length ρ each, our scheme would only require
reading ρ + log k bits (in addition to a few more bits, whose quantity is independent of ρ and k)
from each party’s share (of a reconstruction set) to locally reconstruct a single block of the message.
We show an application of our locally reconstructable non-malleable secret sharing scheme to a
computational non-malleable secure message transmission scheme in the pre-processing model, with
an improved communication complexity, when transmitting multiple messages.
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1 Introduction
Secret Sharing Schemes
Secret sharing schemes [29, 6] allow a dealer holding a secret m, to distribute the secret
across a set of parties P1, P2, · · · , Pn as shares m1, m2, · · · , mn such that subsets of parties
authorised by the dealer can reconstruct the secret m and all the other subsets of parties
have no information about the secret. Secret sharing schemes are fundamental building
blocks in secure computation.
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Non-malleability
Non-malleable secret sharing schemes(NMSS) were introduced by Goyal and Kumar [18].
They ensure that if the shares of an authorised set are tampered, then reconstruction of these
tampered shares is either same as the original secret or it is some independent of the original
secret. Since their introduction, NMSS received wide attention with a long line of work
[18, 19, 31, 3, 17, 2, 8, 25, 28, 26], [12, 9]. NMSS are built specific to the class of tampering
that the shares undergo. This is because without any restriction of the tampering it is
impossible to build NMSS as the tampering function can take all the shares of an authorised
set and reconstruct m, compute the shares of m + 1 with respect to this authorised set and
sets them as the tampered shares. In this case, the reconstruction of the tampered shares
will give m + 1, which is not same as m but is very much related to m. Tampering families
that were studied so far in the context of NMSS are a)independent tampering: tampering of
a share depends solely on itself and is independent of the other shares b) joint tampering:
tampering of a share can depend on few other shares c) affine tampering: All shares can be
tampered together, but the tampering function is restricted to be an affine function.
Locality Reconstructability/Recoverability
Inspired from the (well studied) notion of locality in the context of codes (error correcting codes
[21, 10] and Non-malleable codes [15, 11, 14]), we study the notion of local reconstructability
in the context of secret sharing schemes. A secret sharing scheme is locally reconstructable,
if it facilitates retrieval of a portion of the underlying secret such that one does not need to
read through the entire share of each party in an authorised set but instead can just read a
few locations from shares of parties in the authorised set.
1.1 Our Result
We define the notion of locally reconstructable non-malleable secret sharing schemes
(inspired from [15]), which are non-malleable secret sharing schemes infused with the
feature of local reconstructability. Suppose the secret to be shared is parsed as a sequence
of blocks m = (m1, · · · , mk). Assume m is shared, the shares are (possibly) tampered
and let m̃ = (m̃1, · · · , m̃k) denote the reconstruction of the tampered shares. The non-
malleability guarantee is that, either m̃ is independent of m or there exists an efficiently
samplable set description I ⊂ {1, · · · , k} (independent of m) such that for i ∈ I, m̃i = ⊥
and for i /∈ I, m̃i = mi.
We show how to compile any non-malleable secret sharing scheme secure against some
tampering model Fnm into a locally reconstructable Non-malleable secret sharing scheme.
Our tampering model: The above compiled scheme is non-malleable against the
following tampering family. Parse each share shi as consisting two parts ai and bi, i.e
shi = (ai, bi). bi’s (for i ∈ {1, · · · , n}) can be tampered jointly and arbitrarily but
independent of any aj . All ai’s can be tampered together as per the tampering allowed
by the underlying non-malleable secret sharing i.e by any f ∈ Fnm. In addition, we can
allow the description of this tampering function to depend on the values (b1, · · · , bn). We
give a pictorial representation of our tampering model in Figure 1. We will call this family
as the Lookahead family as tampering of ai’s can depend on bi’s but not vice-versa1.
1 While this may seem like an artificial model of tampering, we indeed show an application of this model
to a non-malleable secure message transmission protocol.
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Figure 1 Lookahead tampering. Solid arrows signify that the tampering function of ai’s (which
is f) can depend on bi’s.
Parameters: Let each block of the message be ρ bits long, where ρ is some polynomial
in the computational security parameter λ. Upon appropriate instantiation, we have an
LRNMSS with share length of each party being k(ρ + log k + 2λ) + r(2λ), where r(α)
is denotes the length of a share of the underlying NMSS upon sharing an α-bit secret.
Asymptotically, for long messages the rate( message lengthshare length per party ) of the compiled locally
reconstructable NMSS is 11+o(1) when (log k ≪ ρ). To locally reconstruct any particular
block, each party of an authorised set needs to read only ρ + log k + r(2λ) + 2λ bits. Note
that this quantity only depends logarithmically on k.
Non-malleable secure message transmission in the pre-processing model: We
show an application of our locally reconstructable non-malleable secret sharing scheme
to a computational non-malleable message transmission protocol, in the pre-processing
model (where a sender and a receiver communicate, first in a message-independent offline
phase and then in a message dependent online phase). We show that a combination of
our locality feature and the pre-processing, helps us improve communication, specially
when the sender wants to transmit multiple messages.
1.2 Technical Overview
We parse the secret to be shared as a sequence of blocks (typically of same length) m =
(m1, · · · , mk). Let NMShare denote the non-malleable secret sharing scheme to be compiled
into a locally reconstructable NMSS. Let Encrypt be any symmetric key authenticated
encryption scheme. Then our compiler proceeds as follows.
Choose an authentication encryption key K
Secret share K using NMShare. Let a1, · · · , an be the shares.
Encrypt each block mi(i ∈ {1, · · · , k}) along with its location stamp, ci ← EncryptK(mi||i)
For all i ∈ {1, · · · , n}, set bi = (c1, c2, · · · , ck)
Output shi = (ai, bi)
The scheme is locally reconstructable as to recover (say) jth block, the authorised set of
parties need to put together only (their respective)ai’s and cj(which is given to them as
part of bi). Then they can check the consistency of these cj ’s, reconstruct K and decrypt cj
using K to obtain mj . If any of the above checks fail, the parties abort. This reconstruction
procedure can be naturally extended to recover all the blocks. The works of [24, 1, 13, 17]
use similar techniques to improve the rate, while the focus of our work is to achieve locality.
Now we provide a very brief idea of why the above scheme is non-malleable. Suppose
even after tampering, if the tampered authenticated encryption key remained the same,
then any tampering of the ciphertexts would be detected by the integrity of authenticated
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encryption. If the tampered authenticated key turns out to be independent of K, then all
the information about K is lost in the shares, and the ciphertexts do not reveal anything
about the messages they encrypt by the indistinguishability of encryption. We provide more
details in the technical sections.
Our tampering model does not allow the tampering of ciphertexts to depend on shares of
the encryption key. Allowing this kind of tampering will result in the tampered ciphertexts
depending indirectly on the encryption key, which would break the encryption security.
Although our scheme can be made secure against individual tampering by using secret
sharing schemes with stronger security guarantees (e.g. leakage resilient schemes) as the
underlying scheme, this trail would worsen the rate and deviate from our focus on building a
rate-1 scheme.
While the above model for tampering our scheme seems artificial, it is indeed natural
when we apply it in the context of secure message transmission. Particularly, we will send
the shares a1, · · · , an of the key K in the offline phase (independent of the message to be
transmitted) and then send the ciphertext ci corresponding to message mi in the online
phase. Here, the online tampering of the ciphertext, indeed will be independent of the offline
transmissions.
1.3 Organization of the paper
We provide preliminaries in Section 2. Then, we present our LRNMSS definition in Section
3.1 . We define the tampering model in Section 3.2. Our construction and security proof of
the locally reconstructable non-malleable secret sharing scheme appears in Section 3.3 and
Section 3.4, respectively. We also explain how to instantiate the construction in Section 3.5.
In Section 4, we provide an application for our LRNMSS scheme to a non-malleable secure
message transmission protocol in the pre-processing model.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notations
The set of all natural numbers is denoted by N. x← X denotes sampling from a probability
distribution X. All logarithms are base 2. For any two sets S and S′, S\S′ := {x : x ∈
S, x ̸∈ S′}, is the set of elements in S that are not in S′. Let [n] denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Let [n] represents the set of all elements. Then, the complement of the set I denoted by
Ī := {x : x ∈ [n], x ̸∈ I} is the set of all the elements that are not in I. For any set T ⊆ [n]
and a function f outputting n-tuples, f(.)T represents the output of f restricted to the set
T . negl(x) represents negligible function in x. For any two distributions A and B, A ≈c B
means that the distributions A and B are computationally indistinguishable.
2.2 Authenticated Encryption
An encryption scheme consists of a tuple of polynomial-time algorithms E = (Gen, Encrypt,
Decrypt) with key space K, message space M and ciphertext space C such that:
The randomized algorithm Gen takes as input the security parameter λ ∈ N and outputs
a uniform key sk ∈ K.
The randomized algorithm Encrypt takes as input a key sk ∈ K and a message m ∈M
and outputs a ciphertext c ∈ C.
The deterministic algorithm Decrypt takes as input a key sk ∈ K and ciphertext c ∈ {0, 1}∗
and outputs a value m ∈M∪ {⊥}, where ⊥ denotes an invalid ciphertext.
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▶ Definition 1 ([22, 4, 5]). An encryption scheme E = (Gen, Encrypt, Decrypt) is called a
symmetric-key authenticated encryption scheme if it satisfies the following properties:
1. Correctness. For all m ∈M,
Pr[sk ← Gen(1λ); Decryptsk(Encryptsk(m)) = m] = 1
(where probability is taken over randomness of Gen and Encrypt)
2. Semantic Security. For any non-uniform PPT adversary A, it holds that |2·AdvprivE (A)
−1| = negl(λ), where
AdvprivE = Pr[sk ← Gen(1λ); b← {0, 1} : ALRsk,b(·,·)(1λ) = b].
Here, the left-or-right encryption oracle LRsk,b(·, ·) with b ∈ {0, 1} and inputs m0, m1 ∈M
for |m0| = |m1|, is defined as:
LRsk,b(m0, m1) := Encryptsk(mb).
3. Authenticity. For any non-uniform PPT adversary A, it holds that AdvauthE (A) =
negl(λ) where
AdvauthE (A) = Pr[sk ← Gen(1λ), c← AEncryptsk(·) : c /∈ Q ∧ Decryptsk(c) ̸= ⊥]
where Q is list of ciphertexts received by A through the encryption oracle.
2.3 Secret Sharing Schemes
We will be considering computational secret sharing scheme throughout this paper.
▶ Definition 2. Let M be finite set of secrets, where |M| ≥ 2. A scheme Σ = (Share, Rec)
consists of a randomized sharing function Share :M→ S1 × · · · × Sn which takes as input a
secret M ∈M and outputs n shares (s1, . . . , sn) where each si ∈ Si. The scheme Σ is called
a (t, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme with message space M if the following properties
hold:
1. Correctness. For any set T ⊆ [n] such that |T | ≥ t, there exists a deterministic
reconstruction function Rec : ⊗i∈TSi →M such that for every M ∈M,
Pr[Rec(Share(M)T ) = M ] = 1
(over the randomness of the sharing function)
2. Privacy (Computational). For any set U ⊆ [n] such that |U | < t, and for every pair
of secrets M0, M1 ∈M,
{Share(M0)U} ≈c {Share(M1)U}
2.4 Non-malleable Secret Sharing Schemes
Non-malleable secret sharing schemes were first studied in [18]. We will be considering the
computational variant of their definition.
▶ Definition 3. Let Σ = (Share, Rec) be a (t, n)-secret sharing scheme for message space
M. Let F ⊆ {f : S1 × · · · × Sn → S1 × · · · × Sn} be some family of tampering functions.
The scheme is said to be non-malleable w.r.t F if for each f ∈ F and set T ⊆ [n] such that




where NMTamperf,Tm and NMIdealNMSim
f,T















If m̃ = same∗, Output m
Else, Output m̃

3 Locally Reconstructable Non-malleable Secret Sharing
Scheme(LRNMSSS)
In this section, we define and construct non-malleable secret sharing scheme with local
reconstrcutability. Intuitively, this gives a way to secret share blocks of messages such that
in order to recover a single block of message, a small number of bits from each share in a
reconstruction set is needed.
3.1 LRNMSS - Definition
▶ Definition 4. (LRNMSSS) Let (Share, Rec) be a (t, n)-secret sharing scheme for message
space M. The scheme Σ = (Share, Local, Rec) is called a (t, n, p)-locally reconstructable
non-malleable secret sharing scheme for with message space M = M1 × · · · × Mk and
Mi ⊆ {0, 1}ρ ∀i ∈ [k] if:
1. Local Reconstruction. For any M = (m1, . . . , mk) ∈M where mi ∈Mi ∀i ∈ [k], for
any i ∈ [k] and for any set T ⊆ [n] such that |T | ≥ t, there exists a deterministic function
Local such that,
Pr[LocalShare(M)T (i) = mi] = 1
where Local reads at most p bits from each share in T .
2. Non-malleability. Let F be some family of tampering functions. The scheme is said to
be non-malleable w.r.t F if for each f ∈ F and set T ⊆ [n] such that |T | = t, there exists




where Tamperf,TM and IdealSim
f,T













If I∗ = [k], set M̃ = M∗
Else, set M̃ |I∗ = ⊥ and M̃ |I∗ = M |I∗
Output M̃

Now we describe the tampering model we consider in this paper.
3.2 Our Model - Lookahead Tampering
The message is partitioned into k blocks of length ρ. Let Share be a sharing function which
takes as input a message M ∈ {0, 1}kρ and outputs n shares, namely share1, . . . , sharen where
each sharei ∈ {0, 1}γ̂ × {0, 1}kρ̂. Each share can be viewed as k + 1 blocks2. The first block
2 To have correspondence with the explanation in the introduction, one can consider the first block of
each share to be ai and the remaining k blocks to be bi.
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is of length γ̂ and next k blocks are of length ρ̂. Let Fnm(⊆
{
f f : {0, 1}nγ̂ → {0, 1}nγ̂
}
)
be some set of tampering functions. We define a lookahead tampering family F specific to
Fnm. The tampering function family consists of functions of the form (f1, f2) where f1 takes
as input the first blocks of the shares under the constraint that f1 ∈ Fnm. The rest of the
blocks in the shares are hardwired in function f1. The function f2 takes as input the last k
blocks of all the shares.
Our tampering family is defined as :
F =
{
f : (f1, f2) ∀(x1, . . . , xnk) ∈ {0, 1}nkρ̂, f1(·, x1, . . . , xnk) ∈ Fnm,
f2 : {0, 1}nkρ̂ → {0, 1}nkρ̂
}
3.3 Our Construction
We use the following building blocks for the LRNMSS compiler.
1. A symmetric key authenticated encryption scheme E = (Gen, Encrypt, Decrypt) as in Def. 1
with key space K ⊆ {0, 1}γ , message space M⊆ {0, 1}ρ+log k, where k is the number of
message blocks defined in Def. 4 and ciphertext space C ⊆ {0, 1}ρ̂.
2. A non-malleable secret sharing scheme Σ′ = (NMSharetn, NMRectn), which is non-malleable
w.r.t Fnm as in Def. 3 with message space M⊆ {0, 1}γ and share-space Si ⊆ {0, 1}γ̂ for
all i ∈ [n].
Our construction combines a symmetric key authenticated encryption scheme(Def. 1) and a
non-malleable secret sharing scheme (Def. 3) to obtain a locally reconstructable non-malleable
secret sharing scheme(Def. 4).
Upon receiving a message having k blocks, Share function generates a key using the Gen
function of the authenticated encryption and then encrypts each of the message block along
with its index using the key. The key is shared using a non-malleable secret sharing scheme.
A share of the key along with the ciphertexts constitutes a share of LRNMSSS.
On input an index i, Local function reads first and (i + 1)th block of every share in a
reconstruction set. Using the first blocks, Local recovers key using NMRectn function of the
non-malleable secret sharing. A consistency check is also made to make sure that all the
(i + 1)th blocks are the same. The (i + 1)th block is decrypted using the recovered key. It
performs a check to make sure that the index decrypted is the same as input index. Local
outputs decrypted message block.
Rec function reads the shares in a reconstruction set and parses the shares as k + 1 blocks.
First block correspond to the shares of the key. Using NMRectn, it recovers the key . It
performs consistency checks to make sure that all the ciphertext corresponding to an index
are same. Rec outputs the concatenation of the decrypted messages.
The LRNMSS compiler is defined as:
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Share(M): On input M = (m1, m2, . . . , mk),
1. sk ← Gen(1λ).
2. ej ← Encryptsk(mj , j) ∀j ∈ [k].
3. (sk1, . . . , skn)← NMSharetn(sk).
4. Output sharei = (ski, e1, . . . , ek).
LocalshareT (j) : For any reconstruction set T = {i1, . . . .it} ⊆ [n] such that |T | ≥ t,
ski and eij represents the first and (j + 1)th block of sharei respectively. Local reads
(ski1 , e
i1
j ), . . . , (skit , e
it
j ) from shareT on input index j ∈ [k] and evaluates,
1. If ∃ ia, ib s.t. eiaj ̸= e
ib
j , output ⊥ and terminate.
2. Else, recover sk ← NMRectn(ski1 , . . . , skit).
3. Recover (m̃j , j̃)← Decryptsk(ei1j ).
a. If j̃ ̸= j, output ⊥ and terminate.
4. Output m̃j .
Rec(shareT ) : For any reconstruction set T = {i1, . . . .it} ⊆ [n] such that |T | ≥ t and
input shareT = sharei1 , . . . , shareit ,
1. Parse shareij as (skij , e
ij
1 , . . . , e
ij
k ).
2. sk ← NMRectn(ski1 , . . . , skit).
3. For each j ∈ [k],
a. If ∃ ia, ib s.t. eiaj ̸= e
ib
j , set m̃j = ⊥.
b. Else, (m̃j , j̃)← Decryptsk(ei1j ).
i. If j̃ ̸= j, set m̃j = ⊥.
4. Output m̃1, . . . , m̃k.
3.4 Security Analysis
▶ Theorem 5. Let E = (Gen, Encrypt, Decrypt) be a symmetric key authenticated encryption
scheme with ciphertext space C ⊆ {0, 1}ρ̂, Σ′ = (NMSharetn, NMRectn) be a (t, n) non-malleable
secret sharing scheme which is non-malleable w.r.t Fnm with share space Si ⊆ {0, 1}γ̂ for
all i ∈ [n]. Then, the scheme Σ = (Share, Local, Rec) defined above is a (t, n, γ̂ + ρ̂)-locally
reconstrcutable non-malleable secret sharing scheme which is non-malleable with respect to F ,
the lookahead family specific to Fnm.
Proof. Correctness. The correctness of the scheme follows from the correctness of the
underlying secret sharing scheme and encryption scheme.
Local Reconstruction. On input an index i, Local function reads first block and i + 1th
block of the shares in a reconstrution set T . It recovers key from the first blocks of the shares
using NMRectn. That would require Local to read γ̂ bits from each share in T .
Local then checks if the i + 1th block of each share in T are same or not.This would require
Local to read ρ̂ bits from each share in T . If yes, the i + 1th ciphertext block is decrypted
using the recovered key. It performs a check to make sure that i + 1th ciphertext block
corresponds to the message block mi. It checks if the decrypted index is the same as input
index.
Thus, Local needs to read p = (γ̂ + ρ̂) bits from each share in T . Total number of bits to be
retrieved to reconstruct a single block mi is t(γ̂ + ρ̂).
Privacy. Let T ⊂ [n] with |T | < t, be an arbitrary set. We wish to show that for any two
messages M0, M1 ∈M, Share(M0)T ≈c Share(M1)T .
We show this through a sequence of hybrids:
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Hybrid0: This corresponds to the shares of M0 = (m01, . . . , m0k) in the set T . Gener-
ate sk ← Gen(1λ). Further, ej ← Encryptsk(m0j , j) for j ∈ [k] and (sk1, . . . , skn) ←
NMSharetn(sk). Set sharei = (ski, e1, . . . , ek) for each i ∈ T . Output {sharei}i∈T .
Hybrid1: Generate a new key sk′ ← Gen(1λ) and replace the shares of sk in the set T
with the shares of sk′.
Generate sk ← Gen(1λ) and sk′ ← Gen(1λ). Further, ej ← Encryptsk(m0j , j) for j ∈ [k]
and (sk′1, . . . , sk′n) ← NMSharetn(sk′). Set sharei = (sk′i, e1, . . . , ek) for each i ∈ T .
Output {sharei}i∈T .
Hybrid2: Replace the encryptions of message M0 with encryptions of message M1 =
(m11, . . . , m1k).
Generate sk ← Gen(1λ) and sk′ ← Gen(1λ). Further, e′j ← Encryptsk(m1j , j) for j ∈ [k]
and (sk′1, . . . , sk′n) ← NMSharetn(sk′). Set sharei = (sk′i, e′1, . . . , e′k) for each i ∈ T .
Output {sharei}i∈T .
Hybrid3: This corresponds to the shares of M1 = (m11, . . . , m1k) in the set T . Gener-
ate sk ← Gen(1λ). Further, e′j ← Encryptsk(m1j , j) for j ∈ [k] and (sk1, . . . , skn) ←
NMSharetn(sk). Set sharei = (ski, e′1, . . . , e′k) for each i ∈ T . Output {sharei}i∈T .
Here, Hybrid0 ≡ Share(M0)T and Hybrid3 ≡ Share(M1)T .
By the computational privacy of Σ′ = (NMSharetn, NMRectn), we get Hybrid0 ≈c Hybrid1 and by
the semantic security of E = (Gen, Encrypt, Decrypt), it follows Hybrid1 ≈c Hybrid2. Finally,
again by the computational privacy of Σ′ = (NMSharetn, NMRectn), it follows Hybrid2 ≈c
Hybrid3.
Thus, Share(M0)T ≡ Hybrid0 ≈c Hybrid1 ≈c Hybrid2 ≈c Hybrid3 ≡ Share(M1)T .
Non-malleability. To show the non-malleability of our scheme, we need to show that




For any f = (f1, f2) ∈ F and any reconstruction set T = {i1, . . . , it}, we begin by describing
the simulator Simf,T .
For each (e1, . . . , ek) ∈ {0, 1}kρ̂, we define a function g : {0, 1}nγ̂ → {0, 1}nγ̂ , hardwired with
n copies of (e1, . . . , ek), as g(x) = f1(x, (ei1, . . . , eik)i∈[n]),∀x ∈ {0, 1}nγ̂ where (ei1, . . . , eik) =
(e1, . . . , ek),∀i ∈ [n]. Hence, by definition of F , g ∈ Fnm. Let NMSimg,T be the simulator
for the underlying NMSS (which is non-malleable w.r.t Fnm) and ϕ denote the empty string.
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Simf,T :
1. sk ← Gen(1λ).
2. ej ← Encryptsk(0ρ+log k) ∀j ∈ [k].
3. Set eij = ej ∀j ∈ [k],∀i ∈ [n] and hardwire them in g.
4. s̃k ← NMSimg,T .
5. If s̃k = same∗,
a. (ẽi1, . . . , ẽik)i∈[n] ← f2((ei1, . . . , eik)i∈[n]).
b. I = {j : ẽiaj ̸= ẽ
ib
j for some ia, ib ∈ T}.





d. Set (I∗, M∗) = (I ∪ I1, ϕ).
6. Else,
a. (ẽi1, . . . , ẽik)i∈[n] ← f2((ei1, . . . , eik)i∈[n]).
b. I = {j : ẽiaj ̸= ẽ
ib
j for some ia, ib ∈ T}.
c. ∀j ∈ I, set m̃j = ⊥.
d. ∀j /∈ I, (m̃j , j̃)← Decrypts̃k(ẽ
i1
j ).
i. If j̃ ̸= j, set m̃j = ⊥.
e. Set (I∗, M∗) = ([k], m̃1, . . . , m̃k).
7. Output (I∗, M∗).
For any f = (f1, f2) ∈ F , any reconstruction set T = {i1, . . . , it} and any message M =
(m1, . . . , mk) ∈M, we define the tamper distribution, Tamperf,TM as below.
Tamperf,TM :
1. sk ← Gen(1λ).
2. ej ← Encryptsk(mj , j) ∀j ∈ [k].
3. Set eij = ej ∀j ∈ [k],∀i ∈ [n].
4. (sk1, . . . , skn)← NMSharetn(sk).
5. sharei = (ski, ei1, . . . , eik).
6. (s̃hare1, . . . , s̃haren)← f(share1, . . . , sharen).
7. Parse s̃harei as (s̃ki, ẽi1, . . . , ẽik) ∀i ∈ [n].
8. s̃k ← NMRectn(s̃ki1 , . . . , s̃kit).
9. For each j ∈ [k]
a. If ∃ ia, ib ∈ T s.t. ẽiaj ̸= ẽ
ib
j , set m̃j = ⊥.
b. Else, (m̃j , j̃)← Decrypts̃k(ẽ
i1
j ).
i. If j̃ ̸= j, set m̃j = ⊥.
10. Output m̃1, . . . , m̃k.




We define the first hybrid, which only has some notational changes with respect to Tamperf,TM
and is equivalent to it.




M is the same as the tampering experiment with
few differences. We expand the function f giving f1 and f2. Then, f2 is placed after the
non-malleable secret reconstruction, because NMRectn doesn’t depend on the output of f2. A
new variable I is also defined to maintain the indices having inconsistent ciphertexts.
Steps (5)− (10) of Tamperf,TM is replaced with the following steps (5)− (10) in Hybrid1
f,T
M .
5. s̃k1, . . . , s̃kn ← f1(sk1, . . . , skn, (ei1, . . . , eik)i∈[n]).
6. s̃k ← NMRectn(s̃ki1 , . . . , s̃kit).
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7. (ẽi1, . . . , ẽik)i∈[n] ← f2((ei1, . . . , eik)i∈[n]).
8. I = {j : ẽiaj ̸= ẽ
ib
j for some ia, ib ∈ T}.
9. a. ∀j ∈ I, set m̃j = ⊥.
b. ∀j /∈ I, (m̃j , j̃)← Decrypts̃k(ẽ
i1
j ).
i. If j̃ ̸= j, set m̃j = ⊥.
10. Output m̃1, . . . , m̃k.




Proof. Clearly, only the notations were modified in Hybrid1f,TM and the distribution remains
the same. Hence Tamperf,TM is identical to Hybrid1
f,T
M . ◁
In our next hybrid, we use the non-malleability of our underlying NMSS. Hence, we replace
the tamper distribution of the underlying NMSS with its simulator.




M is the same as Hybrid1
f,T
M , except that the
simulator, NMSimg,T , for the underlying NMSS, Σ′ = (NMSharetn, NMRectn), is used to
generate the tampered key s̃k.
Steps (4)− (6) of Hybrid1f,TM is replaced with the following steps (4)− (5) in Hybrid2
f,T
M .
4. s̃k ← NMSimg,T .
5. If s̃k = same∗, set s̃k = sk.
▷ Claim 7. If Σ′ = (NMSharetn, NMRectn) is a non-malleable secret sharing scheme w.r.t.




Proof. If the two hybrids are computationally distinguishable, we can build an adversary
A breaking the non-malleable property of the Σ′. Let D be the distinguisher that can
distinguish between Hybrid1f,TM and Hybrid2
f,T
M .
The adversary A is defined as follows:
1. A generates sk ← Gen(1λ).
2. A computes ej ← Encryptsk(mj , j) for j ∈ [k].
3. Set eij = ej ∀j ∈ [k],∀i ∈ [n].
4. A sends sk, g, (ei1, . . . , eik)i∈[n] to the challenger.
5. A after receiving challenge s̃k from the challenger, does the following:
a. (ẽi1, . . . , ẽik)i∈[n] ← f2((ei1, . . . , eik)i∈[n])
b. I = {j : ẽiaj ̸= ẽ
ib
j for some ia, ib ∈ T}
c. ∀j ∈ I, set m̃j = ⊥
d. ∀j /∈ I, (m̃j , j̃)← Decrypts̃k(ẽ
i1
j )
i. If j̃ ̸= j, set m̃j = ⊥.
e. Sends D(m̃1, . . . , m̃k) to the challenger.
If the challenge corresponds to the output of the tampered experiment NMTamperg,Tsk , then
D will be invoked with distribution corresponding to Hybrid1f,TM . Otherwise, D will be
invoked with distribution corresponds to the simulated experiment NMIdealNMSimg,Tsk . This
contradicts the non-malleability property of Σ′. ◁
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In the next hybrid, we only make a few notational changes, leading to an identical distribu-
tion.
Rewriting Hybrid2f,TM as Hybrid3
f,T
M : In Hybrid3
f,T
M , s̃k = same∗ and s̃k ̸= same∗ are con-
sidered as two different cases. When s̃k = same∗, a new variable I1 is defined to maintain
the indices having consistent, but tampered ciphertexts. For all the indices other than those
in I ∪ I1, the key and the ciphertexts were not tampered. Decrypt outputs the original
message block, mi, at those indices.
Steps (5)− (10) of Hybrid2f,TM is replaced with the following steps (5)− (7) in Hybrid3
f,T
M .
5. If s̃k = same∗,
a. (ẽi1, . . . , ẽik)i∈[n] ← f2((ei1, . . . , eik)i∈[n]).
b. I = {j : ẽiaj ̸= ẽ
ib
j for some ia, ib ∈ T}.





d. ∀j ∈ I, set m̃j = ⊥.
e. ∀j ∈ I1, (m̃j , j̃)← Decryptsk(ẽi1j ).
i. If j̃ ̸= j, set m̃j = ⊥.
f. ∀j /∈ I ∪ I1, set m̃j = mj .
6. Else,
a. (ẽi1, . . . , ẽik)i∈[n] ← f2((ei1, . . . , eik)i∈[n]).
b. I = {j : ẽiaj ̸= ẽ
ib
j for some ia, ib ∈ T}.
c. ∀j ∈ I, set m̃j = ⊥.
d. ∀j /∈ I, (m̃j , j̃)← Decrypts̃k(ẽ
i1
j ).
i. If j̃ ̸= j, set m̃j = ⊥.
7. Output m̃1, . . . , m̃k.




Proof. The only difference between these hybrids are that instead of a single case in
Hybrid2Mf,T , two cases were introduced in Hybrid3f,TM with both the cases executing the same
steps. Hence, they are identical distributions. ◁
In our next hybrid, we use the authenticity property of the underlying authenticated
encryption scheme in order to completely remove the use of the original secret key sk.
Going from Hybrid3f,TM to Hybrid4
f,T
M : In Hybrid4
f,T
M , the decrypted messages corresponding
to the indices in the set I1 are set to ⊥.
Step 5(e) in Hybrid3f,TM is replaced with the following step in Hybrid4
f,T
M .
5. e. ∀j ∈ I1, set m̃j = ⊥.
▷ Claim 9. If E = (Gen, Encrypt, Decrypt) is an authenticated symmetric key encryption




Proof. If the hybrids are computationally distinguishable, we can build an adversary which
can break the authenticity property of the encryption scheme. Note that the two hybrids differ
only in the case where s̃k = same∗ and the set I1 is non-empty and are identical otherwise.
Pick a message M = (m1, . . . , mk) ∈M for which the two hybrids are distinguishable.
Adversary A, which can compute a valid new ciphertext, is defined as:
1. A sends (mj , j)j∈[k] as queries to the challenger.
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2. A on receiving e1, . . . , ek from the challenger, does the following
a. Set eij = ej ∀j ∈ [k],∀i ∈ [n].
b. s̃k ← NMSimg,T .
c. (ẽi1, . . . , ẽik)i∈[n] ← f2((ei1, . . . , eik)i∈[n]).





e. A sends (ẽi1j )j∈I1 to the challenger.
From our assumption that the two hybrids are distinguishable, we know that there exists
some j ∈ I1 such that the corresponding ciphertext ẽi1j is valid, i.e., Decryptsk(ẽ
i1
j ) ̸= ⊥.
Since j ∈ I1, we know that ẽiaj = ẽ
ib
j for all ia, ib ∈ T and ẽ
i1
j ≠ ej . Moreover, because of
the index j being appended to the message, ẽi1j ≠ eq, for each q ∈ [k]. This implies that
the adversary A outputs a valid ciphertext, which it did not receive as a challenge, hence
breaking the authenticity of the encryption. ◁
Next, we use the semantic security of the authentication scheme to move to a hybrid where,
the actual message is no longer used in the encryption.
Going from Hybrid4f,TM to Hybrid5
f,T
M : In Hybrid5
f,T
M , the ciphertexts corresponding to M are
replaced with the ciphertexts corresponding to 0ρ+log k.
Step 2 in Hybrid4f,TM is replaced with the following step in Hybrid5
f,T
M .
2. ej ← Encryptsk(0ρ+log k) ∀j ∈ [k]
▷ Claim 10. If E = (Gen, Encrypt, Decrypt) is an authenticated encryption scheme, then for




Proof. Assume to the contrary that, there exists M ∈ M and a distinguisher D that can
distinguish between the hybrids Hybrid4f,TM and Hybrid5
f,T
M . The distinguisher D can be used
to construct another distinguisher D1 which violates the semantic security of the underlying
encryption scheme E .
The distinguisher D1 is defined as follows:
1. D1 sets M0 = (mj , j)j∈[k], M1 = 0k(ρ+log k).
2. D1 sends (M0, M1) to the challenger.
3. D1 on receiving (e1, . . . , ek) from the challenger, does the following,
a. Set eij = ej ∀j ∈ [k],∀i ∈ [n].
b. s̃k ← NMSimg,T .
c. If s̃k = same∗,
i. (ẽi1, . . . , ẽik)i∈[n] ← f2((ei1, . . . , eik)i∈[n]).
ii. I = {j : ẽiaj ̸= ẽ
ib
j for some ia, ib ∈ T}.





iv. ∀j ∈ I, set m̃j = ⊥ .
v. ∀j ∈ I1, set m̃j = ⊥.
vi. ∀j /∈ I ∪ I1, set m̃j = mj .
d. Else,
i. (ẽi1, . . . , ẽik)i∈[n] ← f2((ei1, . . . , eik)i∈[n]).
ii. I = {j : ẽiaj ̸= ẽ
ib
j for some ia, ib ∈ T}.
iii. ∀j ∈ I, set m̃j = ⊥.
iv. ∀j /∈ I, (m̃j , j̃)← Decrypts̃k(ẽ
i1
j ).
A. If j̃ ̸= j, set m̃j = ⊥.
e. D1 sends D(m̃1, . . . , m̃k) to the challenger.
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If the challenge corresponds to the ciphertext of M0, then D will be invoked with the distri-
bution corresponding to Hybrid4f,TM . Otherwise, the distribution corresponds to Hybrid5
f,T
M .
This contradicts the semantic security of E . ◁
We finally make some notational changes to the above hybrid, to get an identical distribution,
which would be IdealSimf,TM .
Rewriting Hybrid5f,TM as Hybrid6
f,T
M : The new variable I∗ represents the set of tampered
indices. If shares are entirely tampered, the output will be independent of the original
message. If the tampering function doesn’t change first blocks of shares, then any modification
will output ⊥. I∗ keeps track of these indices. The simulator for the LRNMSSS outputs
tampered indices along with message vector. If the shares are entirely tampered, Hybrid6f,TM
will output the message vector which is independent of original message. If the first block
is not tampered, the Hybrid6f,TM outputs ⊥ at indices in I∗ and original messages for other
indices.
Steps (5)− (7) of Hybrid5f,TM are replaced with the following steps in Hybrid6
f,T
M
5. If s̃k = same∗,
a. (ẽi1, . . . , ẽik)i∈[n] ← f2((ei1, . . . , eik)i∈[n]).
b. I = {j : ẽiaj ̸= ẽ
ib
j for some ia, ib ∈ T}.





d. Set (I∗, M∗) = (I ∪ I1, ϕ).
6. Else,
a. (ẽi1, . . . , ẽik)i∈[n] ← f2((ei1, . . . , eik)i∈[n]).
b. I = {j : ẽiaj ̸= ẽ
ib
j for some ia, ib ∈ T}.
c. ∀j ∈ I, set m̃j = ⊥.
d. ∀j /∈ I, (m̃j , j̃)← Decrypts̃k(ẽ
i1
j ).
i. If j̃ ̸= j, set m̃j = ⊥.
e. Set (I∗, M∗) = ([k], m̃1, . . . , m̃k).
7. If I∗ = [k], set M̃ = M∗.
8. Else, set M̃ |I∗ = ⊥ and M̃ |I∗ = M |I∗ .
9. Output M̃ .




Proof. When I∗ = [k], key can be tampered or not. If the key was tampered, M∗ stores the
messages decrypted using the tampered key at all the indices. Hybrid5f,TM also outputs the
decrypted messages at all indices when the key is tampered. If the key was not tampered,
M∗ stores empty vector. Hybrid6f,TM outputs M∗ in that case. If I∗ = [k], then I ∪ I1 = [k].
Hybrid5f,TM outputs ⊥ at all the indices.
When I∗ ̸= [k], key was not tampered. Both the hybrids output ⊥ at those indices in
I∗ = I ∪ I1. On all the other indices, Hybrid5f,TM and Hybrid6
f,T
M outputs original message
corresponding to their indices. Both the hybrids behave the same for all the cases. Thus,
Hybrid5f,TM and Hybrid6
f,T
M are identical. ◁
From our description of the simulator, Simf,T , clearly Hybrid6f,TM is the same as IdealSim
f,T
M .
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3.5 Instantiation
Let the secret to be shared in LRNMSS consists of k blocks, with size of each block ρ, where ρ
is some polynomial in the computational security parameter λ. Let (NMSharetn, NMRectn) be a
NMSS with length of the each share being r(α) when a α-bit secret is shared. Authenticated
encryption (Gen, Encrypt, Dec) scheme is instantiated with Encrypt-and-authenticate scheme
mentioned in Section 4.5 of [20] . We let the encryption key, randomness and tag to be of
length 2λ, λ and λ respectively. The encryption scheme takes messages of length ρ + log k,
outputs a ciphertext of length ρ + log k + 2λ.
For messages of length kρ, a single share of LRNMSS will be of length k(ρ + log k + 2λ) +
r(2λ).
Thus, the rate of LRNMSS is kρk(ρ+log k+2λ)+r(2λ) .
For long messages, rate = 11+o(1) assuming log k ≪ ρ.
For local reconstruction, Local is required to read ρ + log k + 2λ + r(2λ) bits from each
share in a reconstruction set.
4 Computational Non-malleable Multi-message Transmission in the
Pre-processing Model
Perfectly secure message transmission (SMT) was introduced in [16], where a sender S wants
to transmit a message m to a receiver R, through n wires between them, ensuring that
perfect secrecy is guaranteed, even in the presence of an eavesdropping adversary looking
at a bounded number of wires, and perfect resiliency is guaranteed, even in the presence of
an adversary controlling a bounded number of wires completely. Post their introduction,
SMTs have been studied in several works [16, 30, 32, 27, 23]. Non-malleable secure message
transmission (NMSMT) was introduced in [18], where the goal is to guarantee non-malleability
in the presence of an adversary who can tamper all n wires according to some tampering
model (i.e., the tampered message m′ is guaranteed to be either same as the original message
m, or is completely independent of it). Further, they build NMSMTs using non-malleable
secret sharing schemes.
In this work, we show an application of our LRNMSS scheme to build a computational
SMT protocol in the pre-processing model, that allows the sender and receiver to commu-
nicate in two phases: a message-independent offline phase and a message-dependent online
phase, to non-malleably send multiple messages to the receiver, while saving on the online
communication. Formally, we allow S and R to first communicate in an offline phase, where S
sends messages x1, · · · , xn to R (which are all independent of the messages to be transmitted
in the online phase). In the online phase, S can securely send message m by sending a single
message c, through one wire, to R. In both the online and offline phase, the adversary can
tamper the messages being sent (with the restriction that each wire for the offline phase
communication can be arbitrarily tampered independent of each other, and the single wire
for the online phase communication, can be arbitrarily tampered independent of the offline
communication). The guarantee is that the tampered messages are either the same or are
independent of the original messages. To transmit k messages, each of size ρ = poly(λ) (for
security parameter λ), our protocol requires an offline communication of 2λ bits per wire
(with n wires in total) and an online communication of ρ + log k + 2λ bits per message. In
comparison, even if we instantiate the NMSMT protocol of [18] with a rate-1 computational
non-malleable secret sharing scheme [7, 17] (as in our construction), to send k messages of
length ρ each, the protocol would need to commmunicate nρ bits (in total) per message in a
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single online phase. Hence, by introducing an offline phase and by leveraging the locality of
our LRNMSS construction, we save a factor of n in the online communication required.
We now define our model for computational non-malleable multi-message transmission
formally.
▶ Definition 12 (Computational Non-malleable Multi-message Transmission). Let S and R
denote the sender and receiver of the message transmission protocol, respectively and let
M denote the message space from which S wants to transmit messages to R. S and R
communicate in two phases: in the offline phase, they communicate through n wires connecting
them, and in the online phase, they communicate through a single wire. In the offline phase,
S sends messages x1, · · · , xn to R (each xi is sent through the i-th wire). In the online
phase, to transmit a message m to R, S sends the message c. Let π(m1, · · · , mk, S, R) denote
an execution of the protocol to transmit k messages m1, · · · , mk (involving a single offline
phase message and k online phase messages). We say that π(·, S, R) is a k-non-malleable
multi-message transmission protocol with respect to a tampering family Fsplit, if it satisfies
the following properties:
1. Correctness: For all messages m1, · · · , mk ∈ M, at the end of an honest execution
of the protocol π(m1, · · · , mk, S, R), the receiver receives the messages m1, · · · , mk, with
probability 1.
2. Computational Privacy: For every adversary A that can see at most n−1 wires in the
offline phase and the single wire of the online phase, and for each pair of multi-messages
(m1, · · · , mk), (m′1, · · · , m′k),
πviewA (m1, · · · , mk, S, R) ≈c πviewA (m′1, · · · , m′k, S, R),
where πviewA (m1, · · · , mk, S, R) denotes the distribution corresponding to the view of A
in the protocol execution π(m1, · · · , mk, S, R), which includes the messages sent through
n− 1 wires in the offline phase and the messages sent in the online phase.
3. Non-malleability:
Tampering Family Fsplit: We allow each wire of the offline phase to be tampered
independent of each other, and the online phase messages are tampered independent of
all offline messages (but may depend on each other). Hence, each f ∈ Fsplit consists of
functions f1, · · · , fn, g, where each fi acts on wire i of the offline phase and g acts on
the online phase messages.
For each f ∈ Fsplit, there exists a distribution Simf over M, such that, for all sets of
messages (m1, · · · , mk),
Tamperfm1,··· ,mk ≈c Copy(m1, · · · , mk, Sim
f ),
where Tamperfm1,··· ,mk and Copy(m1, · · · , mk, Sim
f ) are defined as follows:
Tamperfm1,··· ,mk =

(x1, · · · , xn, c1, · · · , ck)← π(m1, · · · , mk, S, R)
(x′1, · · · , x′n, c′1, · · · , c′k) = f((x1, · · · , xn, c1, · · · , ck))
(m′1, · · · , m′k)← R(x′1, · · · , x′n, c′1, · · · , c′k)

Copy(m1, · · · , mk, Simf ) =

(I, m∗1, · · · , m∗k)← Sim
f
If I = [k], set m′ = m∗1, · · · , m∗k
Else, set m′|I = ⊥, and m′|I = (mi)i∈I
Output : m′

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Construction. Consider our LRNMSS construction from 3.3, specifically for n-threshold
setting. S generates sk ← Gen(1λ) and sends the shares (sk1, · · · , skn) ← NMSharenn(sk)
through the n-wires in the offline phase (ski is sent through wire i, for each i ∈ [n]). For
each message mj (j ∈ [k]) in the online phase, S sends the ciphertext cj = Encryptsk(mj , j)
to R. Now, clearly, R can reconstruct to recover sk from the offline communication and
decrypt each ciphertext from the online phase3
▶ Theorem 13. Let the messages being transmitted be of ρ bits each. If (NMSharenn, NMRec
n
n)
is a n-threshold computational non-malleable secret sharing scheme against independent
tampering (each share tampered independently and arbitrarily) with rate 1 and (Gen, Encrypt,
Decrypt) is a symmetric key authenticated encryption scheme, then the above construction
describes a k-non-malleable multi-message transmission protocol with respect to the tampering
family Fsplit with an offline communication complexity of 2nλ bits (through all wires combined)
and an online communication complexity of (ρ + log k + 2λ) bits, per message sent.
Proof. The correctness and computational privacy of the protocol directly follow from the
correctness and privacy of our LRNMSS scheme.
For non-malleability, note that the tampering model Fsplit, is in fact weaker than the
tampering model F of our LRNMSS. Note that, tampering of the shares sent in the offline
face indeed belong to Fnm (here, the tampering doesn’t depend on the ciphertexts sent in the
online phase) and the ciphertexts are all tampered independent of the offline shares. Hence,
by the non-malleability of our LRNMSS scheme, the non-mallebility of our SMT protocol
follows.
Communication Cost. Let each message being transmitted be of ρ bits, k be the number
of messages transmitted, λ be the security parameter, n be the number of wires in the offline
phase. If we instantiate our protocol with the rate 1 computational NMSS scheme of [17, 7],
we get a total offline communication complexity of 2nλ bits and an online communication
complexity of (ρ + log k + 2λ) bits, per message. ◀
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